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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 900180 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Priority No. 2 
BRYON DALE PETERSON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from defendant's convictions for 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony; two counts of 
attempted second degree murder, both second degree felonies; and 
being a habitual criminal, after a trial in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in finding 
"good cause" existed for failure to bring the charges against 
defendant to trial within 120 days of defendant's request for 
disposition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990)? An 
appellate court will overturn the decision of the lower court 
only if it finds the lower court abused its discretion in finding 
"good cause" for the matter not being heard within 120 days. 
State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1982) (per curiam). 
2. Did the lower court properly find defendant's 
motion for recusal to be untimely where it was filed during the 
first day of trial? A lower court's findings of fact will not be 
set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191f 192-93 (Utah 1987). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990): 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge -
Duties of custodial officer - Continuance may be 
granted - Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to 
trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term 
of imprisonment in the state prison, jail, or 
other penal or correctional institution of 
this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment 
or information, and the prisoner shall 
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer in authority, or any appropriate 
agent of the same, a written demand 
specifying the nature of the charge and the 
court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall 
be entitled to have the charge brought to 
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery 
of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer, upon receipt of the demand described 
in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause 
the demand to be forwarded by personal 
delivery or certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to the appropriate prosecuting 
attorney and court clerk. The warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon 
request of the prosecuting attorney so 
notified, provide the attorney with such 
information concerning the term of commitment 
of the demanding prisoner as shall be 
requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as 
required in Subsection (1), the prosecutor 
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for 
good cause shown in open court, with the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought 
to trial within 120 days, or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the 
proceeding. If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is 
not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or 
not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d): 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely 
raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial or 
at the time set by the court shall constitute 
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown 
may grant relief from such waiver. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c): 
Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of 
venue• 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in 
any criminal action or proceeding files an 
affidavit that the judge before whom the 
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard 
as a bias or prejudice, either against the 
party or his attorney or in favor of any 
opposing party to the suit, the judge shall 
proceed no further until the challenge is 
disposed of. Every affidavit shall state the 
facts and the reasons for the belief that the 
bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed 
as soon as practicable after the case has 
been assigned or the bias or prejudice is 
known. No affidavit may be filed unless 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of 
record that the affidavit and application are 
made in good faith. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (Supp. 
1989); two counts of attempted second degree murder, both second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 and 
76-4-101 (Supp. 1989); possession of a dangerous weapon by an 
unauthorized person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1989); and being a habitual 
criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1989) 
(R. 2-3). Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and 
both counts of attempted second degree murder after a jury trial 
on February 15 and 16, 1990, in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court, in and for Emery County, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, 
Judge, presiding (R. 113-15, 158). Additionally, defendant 
waived a jury trial and was convicted by Judge Bunnell of being a 
habitual criminal (R. 368, 372-73). The State dismissed the 
charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by an unauthorized 
person (R. 377). Judge Bunnell sentenced defendant to serve four 
consecutive terms of five years to life in the Utah State Prison 
(R. 121-22, 375-76).* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At around midnight on June 3, 1989, Roseanne Jewkes was 
walking her dog outside her home in Orangeville, Utah, when she 
noticed a pickup truck stopped in the middle of the street 
approximately 90 feet away (R. 263, 264, 277). She thought it 
The State concedes that Judge Bunnell incorrectly sentenced 
defendant to a separate and consecutive term of five years to 
life for being a habitual criminal (R. 121-22). See State v. 
Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
1071 (Utah 1989); State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989). 
Accordingly, this Court should remand this case to the lower 
court for resentencing to three consecutive five to life terms, 
two of which are enhanced from a second degree felony to a first 
degree felony due to defendant's habitual criminal status. 
strange that a pickup would be parked in the middle of the street 
with its lights off (R. 264). She took the dog off the chain and 
proceeded to the edge of the house, hoping she would not be seen 
(Id.). The man driving the truck turned on the engine and 
lights, and pulled the vehicle into the Jewkes' driveway (R. 
265). She positioned herself so that the man could not see her 
(Jd.). Assuming the man had gone to the front door, she turned 
on her flashlight and hurried into the kitchen through the back 
door (Id, ). There she encountered a man standing in the hallway 
(R. 266-67). 
Pointing the flashlight in his face, Roseanne 
recognized defendant as a former schoolmate (R. 267, 281-82). 
Defendant walked toward her, put one hand around her throat, and 
a gun against her stomach (R. 267-68). He said nothing (R. 282). 
Fearing for her life, she grabbed for the gun, knocking it away 
(R. 268, 269, 274). Defendant placed both hands around her 
throat and began to strangle her (R. 268). She screamed for 
help, but eventually lost consciousness (R. 268-69). 
Lola Jewkes, Roseanne's mother, was asleep in her 
bedroom when she was awakened by a scream (R. 290). When she 
walked into the kitchen to investigate, defendant grabbed her and 
began to punch and choke her (R. 291-92). Lola saw Roseanne 
lying on the floor nearby and thought her daughter was dead. 
(jEd.). Regaining consciousness, Roseanne got to her feet, and 
came to her mother's rescue, attacking defendant (R. 293). 
In the struggle, defendant knocked Lola against the 
stove (R. 293, 298). Picking up the grate from the stove, Lola 
hit defendant over the head with it as hard as she could (Icl. ). 
Evidently considering the battle lost, defendant began to retreat 
(]xi.). Seeing the gun lying on the cupboard, Roseanne picked it 
up and fired at defendant as he went out the back door (R. 271). 
Sergeant Norman Vuksinick of the Emery County Sheriff's 
Office arrived at 12:22 a.m. (R. 225-26). Shortly thereafter, 
Officer Loury Hansen discovered a trail of blood leading to 
defendant lying under a small tree (R. 231). Defendant's shirt 
was torn and he had a bullet wound in the left side of his back 
(R. 232). Hansen also discovered a gun holster and belt in the 
seat of defendant's pickup (R. 236). 
On July 10, 1989, defendant delivered a "Notice and 
Request for Disposition of Pending Charge(s)" to an agent of the 
Utah State Prison (R. 24, 45-46) (see Appendix "A"; Notice and 
Request). A preliminary hearing was held August 3, 1989, at 
which time defendant was bound over for trial (R. 1). 
Arraignment was held in district court on September 6, 1989 (R. 
12). At the hearing, defendant attempted to fire his appointed 
counsel (R. 12, 148) (see Appendices "B" and "C"; Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law; Transcript). Judge Bunnell set 
trial for February 15, 1990, partially to give defendant an 
opportunity to reconcile with counsel (R. 149). 
On January 5, 1990, defense counsel sought to withdraw 
(R. 13-15). Judge Bunnell denied the motion on January 12, 1990, 
appointing co-counsel instead (R. 16). 
Defendant moved to dismiss the case on February 7, 
1990, on the grounds that he was not brought to trial within 120 
days under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990). After a hearing held 
on February 14, 1990, Judge Bunnell denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss, finding "good cause" for the delay. (See Appendices "B" 
and "C"; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Transcript). 
On February 15, 1990, defendant sought to have Judge 
Bunnell recuse himself since he allegedly prosecuted defendant in 
1973 (R. 65) (see Appendix "D"; Motion). Judge Bunnell denied 
the motion, finding it to be untimely because he received it 
after the time set for commencement of trial (R. 207) (See 
Appendix "E"; Transcript). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
"Good cause" existed for Judge Bunnell's denial of 
defendant's motion to dismiss where: (1) the delay in trial was 
caused by the need for defendant to reconcile with his defense 
counsel; (2) neither defendant nor his counsel objected to the 
trial setting; (3) the delay was not caused by the action or 
inaction of the prosecution; and (4) no prejudice resulted to 
defendant by the delay. 
Because defendant's motion to recuse Judge Bunnell was 
filed during the first day of trial, Judge Bunnell did not abuse 
his discretion in finding defendant's motion untimely. In any 
event, the fact that a judge previously prosecuted a defendant 
does not result in a per se disqualification of the judge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE BUNNELL DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING "GOOD CAUSE" EXISTED FOR NOT BRINGING 
DEFENDANT TO TRIAL WITHIN 120 DAYS OF 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION. 
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990) 
requires dismissal of the charges against him since his trial was 
not within 120 days of his notice and request for disposition of 
the charges. Defendant's claim must fail. 
Section 77-29-1, whose purpose is "to protect the 
constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to 
prevent those charged with enforcement of criminal statutes from 
holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed charges against 
him," State v. Trujillof 656 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1982) (per 
curiam), provides that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment 
may upon written demand be entitled to have all pending charges 
brought to trial within 120 days. Subsection (4) provides as 
follows: 
In the event the charge is not brought to 
trial within 120 days, or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and the 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the 
proceeding. If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is 
not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or 
not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice, [emphasis added.] 
Thus, if "good cause" is shown for the failure to bring the 
matter to trial within 120 days, the charges need not be 
dismissed. On appeal, a trial court's factual findings in this 
regard should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Trujillo 656 
When the delay -- •: •" " - matter did not result 
fiopn t ho pno •" ut "•»'»'' actions or inactions, this Court has 
consistently upheld <. . ower court's finding ot 'good cause." See 
State v, Stillings, 709 P.2d 348, 349 (Utah 1985) (defense 
::o\ insel mar i t€ reqi lest for d i scover j ) ; State v. Tr~ ,ino, 656 
P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1982)(per curiam) (codefendant changing plea 
from guilty to not guilty); State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 1 16 
(Utah ] 9 8 ? ) | <Je J end*?«\ i i ei \ uus t e« I con tin u.;» 111"' \ In State -
B a n n e r , 717 P,2d 1"J2*.» 1327-28 (Utah 1986), this Court explained 
that four factors are helpful in conducting a speedy trial 
analysis: (I ) i, lie' Lengi.h of; delay; | il | i he reasons tor L lie 
delay; j defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the 
prej - ^fendant. 
In the present case, Judge Bunnell 
cause * soundly based. First, he found that the delay in trial 
was • ire trial counsel -,r 
the arraignment hearing held September 6 n9P9 ': 
148-4 9 | (see Appendices ^ • Atrial date o1 February 
1" d 1 defends ill din I counsel 
sufficient time to reconcile their differences, and if not to 
allow counsel sufficient time to prepare for trial (Id. 
Second .; : e Hunnel I louiiil thfil defeiiddid ^ived the l ?(c i 
statutory period by failing to object to the trial setting when 
asked it I hi IIHM * au acceptable ( 7-1R, 149). Third, ho 
found that the delay in conducting the trial was noi: a itosu.lt >t 
the actions or inactions of the prosecution (R. 119, 149-50). 
Finally, he found that defendant was not prejudiced by the delay 
where the delay was reasonable, defendant was concurrently 
incarcerated on a separate matter, and there was no allegation of 
staleness of the evidence or unavailability of witnesses as a 
result of the delay (R. 118, 147-50). 
Defendant cites State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 
P.2d 158 (1969), for the proposition that he had no affirmative 
duty after filing his request for disposition to pursue a trial, 
that he may stand silent without waiving his statutory speedy 
trial right, and that the lower court lost jurisdiction upon 
expiration of the time period. However, Wilson interpreted the 
predecessor statute to § 77-29-1 which removed the jurisdiction 
of the state courts upon expiration of the time period. See Utah 
Cede Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953) (repealed 1980). Unlike the present 
statute, the statute in Wilson did not permit judicial discretion 
to determine whether or not "good cause" existed for the delay. 
Id. Thus, Wilson is unhelpful to defendant where good cause 
existed for the delay as contemplated under the current statute. 
Finally, defendant argues that the delay was 
unreasonable because new counsel could have been appointed at the 
time of the arraignment, allowing the trial to be held within 120 
days. However, this Court rejected a similar claim in State v. 
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753 (Utah 1985). In Bullock, defense counsel 
became ill on the date set for trial. Id. at 756. Defendant 
requested his counsel be dismissed and expressed a willingness to 
proceed pro se. Id. The trial court denied his request and set 
,i ti'iiil date beyond the statutory period. Id, This Court 
affirmed the trial court1 s finding tha t t:l le de.Lay wain reas enable 
and supported by good cause, iu Analogously, Judge Bunnell did 
not. rihuso his- .:l.i seret 1 nn i in , i acting g ( cause existed for the 
delay where defendant • : defense counsel required ai 1 oppc )i: tui :i i t y 
for reconciliation. 
POINT II 
JUDGE BUNNELL DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION TO BE UNTIMELY. 
D(;j I endant ui'xl a r q u H i-' * ha 1 In d«\servep a new ** 
since Judge Bunnell was prejudiced against him. Allegedly, Judge 
Bunnell had prosecuted defendant in October 1973, and recused 
2 himself I n another trial involving detei idai it i n December 1 981 
(R 65-6 6) (see Appendix ' , Motion). Judge Bunnell denied 
elef endai i I: "  s i:eques 1: t 1: Iat he recuse himself because it was 
untimely, having been made the morning of t r ^ , : 207) (see 
Appendix M E " ; Transcript). 
Defendant arknowJ ftdqes-i in his hi let" that: Rule 29(c), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, required him I H i e the 
request for disqualification "as soon as practicable after the 
case lids beei'i assigned nn I in1 I.Mas or pi f- judicip is known ' (Brief 
of App. at I ') However, defendant claims that the rule contains 
no sanction for failing to comply. Icl. Defendant is mistaken. 
The fact that a judge previously prosecuted a defendant does 
not necessarily require that the judge be disqualified. State v, 
Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah), cert, denied, Belt v Utah, 
487 U.S. 1220 (1988). 
Rule 12(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
that the M[f]ailure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or 
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial 
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, 
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver." 
As this Court noted in a civil case, "While the Utah rule imposes 
no specific time limitation on the filing of a motion for 
disqualification, timeliness is still essential." Madsen v. 
Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988).3 The 
Madsen Court went on to note, "To be timely, a motion to 
disqualify should be filed at counsel's first opportunity after 
learning of the disqualification facts. Only if good cause for a 
delay is demonstrated in the motion seeking disqualification 
should a delinquent notice even be considered." Id. 
In the instant case, defendant first appeared before 
Judge Bunnell on September 6, 1989 (R. 12). Yet, he waited until 
February 15, 1990, the morning scheduled for trial, to bring his 
motion for disqualification (R. 65-66) (see Appendix "D"; 
Motion). When approached with the motion, Judge Bunnell ruled as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Well, let the record show 
that this motion was handed to me fifteen 
minutes after the time fixed for the 
commencement of the trial, and after I had 
already qualified the general jury panel. So 
the court rules that it is not timely filed, 
and the Court cannot grant it at this time, 
to waste the entire time of the Court without 
it having been filed sometime prior so the 
In Madsen, the Court construed rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is substantially the same as rule 29(c), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Court could i ntelligently rule on it. Ana a.^  
constitutes an undue delay of the trial as it 
would be an abuse of the judicial system i f T 
were to grant that at this late date. 
Anything else? 
(l* ,lf| ' I^} AI'H'IK'J " i TraiiHC- i ••«. -.- sis added). 
Even if defense counsel did not know f ^he alleged 
disqualification facts, defendant certainly did, Defendant 
demons ti at. ed nn ijucid -lusf' as l:o wh\ Judg*- Bunne.! I shou Id have 
considered the motion at such a late stage?. Thus, the judge 
acted properly in summarily disposing " defendant's motion filed 
after the commencement of tri a] .-:*.**. ^: ,,. «-*• n . t 
: defendant i - suspend a trial by filing a belated motion to 
-.3 i : ' • ' 3 1 maneuver. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks 
this 
case tc the u \ai court with instructions K correct defendant's 
4 
sentence. 
DATED this 
v^2 
day of October, 1990. 
R # P A U L V A N D A M 
Attorney General 
r T.ADC1?M DAN RTLARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
See note .1 infra. 
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this ZZf f I U = ^ . 190 2_. 
•^r 
L- l i t ; 
y/Jrcs-c- %Ltt< 
thorized Agent 
Utah State Prison 
Draper, Utah 
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APPENDIX B 
F I L E D 
IN THE SEVDTH JUDICAL D'STniCT COURT 
Of UTAH IN £%C F ^ ' ' ' ^ v r o 
MAR 11930 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT BR"CF. C FUNK Clark 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH &&T Deputy 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
BRYON D. PETERSEN, 
DOB 04/21/45 
Defendant. 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
1 MOTION TO DISMISS 
1 Criminal No. 946 
This matter having been before the Court on the 14th day of 
February, 1990, for hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
with the Defendant and his counsel, Keith H. Chiara and Allen S. 
Thorpe, present, and the State being represented by the Emery 
County Attorney, Scott Johansen, and also being present; and the 
Court having reviewed the various memoranda submitted on this 
subject; and having also heard oral arguments, the Court now 
makes the following findings and conclusions: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Notice for Disposition of Pending Charges filed by 
the Defendant in this matter did not specify the nature of the 
pending charges or the court wherein they were pending. 
2. The County Attorney received the Notice sent by the 
Defendant. 
3. The Court received no notice whatsoever. 
4. The Court asked Defendant and defense counsel at trial 
setting on September 6f 1989, whether the dates of February 15 
and 16f 1990, were acceptable to them; and neither the Defendant, 
nor defense counsel, objected to that setting. 
5. The delay between arraignment and the trial was for the 
specific purpose of allowing Defendant to solve any potential 
problems with his counsel. A trial before Defendant and his 
counsel had reconciled their differences or determined that their 
relationship must be severed would not have been in the best 
interest of the Defendant. 
6. There has been no evidence submitted by the Defendant 
of staleness of evidence or unavailability of witnesses as a 
result of the delay in trial. 
7. The Defendant has been incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison since the filing of charges herein as a result of having 
his parole revoked, which is not part of the case before the 
Court at this time. 
8. Due to caseload, a normal trial setting in this 
District, assuming no necessity exists for a more remote setting, 
is 90 to 120 days, absent objection or incarceration of the 
Defendant as a result of a pending charge. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The form sent to the County Attorney by the Defendant 
requesting disposition of pending charges does not comply with 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-29-1. 
2. Strict compliance with Section 77-29-1 is not required, 
and the Notice to the County Attorney was sufficient to put the 
County Attorney upon notice. 
2 Recorded in Judgment Repord 
— J u at Page .A 62, 
3. The delay granted on September 6, 1989 was done within 
the statutory 120-day period. 
4. The delay in commencing the trial was a reasonable 
continuance for good cause shown. 
5. Failure to object to the trial setting at the arraign-
ment amounted to waiver of the statutory right to a trial within 
120 days on the part of the Defendant. 
6. The Defendant has the burden to show that failure to 
try a case prior to the expiration of the statutory 120-day 
period resulted in prejudice to the Defendant or in tactical 
advantage to the prosecution. 
7. In this case, no prejudice to the Defendant or tactical 
advantage to the prosecution has been shown by the Defendant. 
8. The delay in conducting the trial did not result from 
actions or inaction by the prosecution. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is, therefore, denied, and 
this trial will be heard beginning at 9i30 a.m. on February 15, 
1990. 
DATED this s^S day of February, 1990. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the j^t: day of f'ttiTuliZyT 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by 
depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to 
Defendant's attorney as followsi 
Recorded in Judgment Record 
Keith H. Chiara 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 955 
Price, Utah 84501 
Allen S. Thorpe 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1238 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Secretary 
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Yes. Trujillo and Smith. It was Smith that showed up and 
said he had changed his mind. 
MR. JOHANSEN: That's correct. And the 
holding in the Smith case — 
THE COURT: Well, the most recent case was in 
1982, and we haven't had it in the Supreme Court since. 
That's why I'm familiar with that case. Well, gentlemen, of 
course, the Trujillo case does give us some indication. Mr. 
Thorpe, when you talk about an argument of speedy trial, 
that's all this argument is about. Because this was the 
legislature's attempt to say what constitutes a speedy 
trial. They say that if the notice is given for the speedy 
trial — they say it must be held within 120 days. That's 
what the legislature says is constitutional as to a speedy 
trial. And that's all this is. When it's indicated in the 
Trujillo opinion whether or not there's good cause to go beyond 
that, is discretionary with the Court. And even on review, 
all the Supreme Court will do is 'see whether I abused that 
discretion in setting the case beyond the 120 days; my 
abusing it, taking into account the totality the 
circumstance. And in this case, it's true that the form 
that was filed by Mr. Petersen is not in compliance with the 
statute, because the statute says it will name what Court 
the case is pending in. This does not say what Court the 
case is pending in. It just says in Emery County. Of 
19 
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course, we have three courts; four counting the JP Court, 
which we don't consider. But anyway, it also says it will 
say what the charge is. This doesn't say. It just says: 
"all charges." So you don't have any strict compliance with 
the statute as far as the form is concerned. But I don't 
think the statute necessarily requires strict interpretation 
as long as the county attorney received it. Of course, we 
have another problem here where the statute says the warden 
or his agent there at the prison will send a copy to the 
clerk, for obvious reasons. That's so the Court will know 
it's on file. There's no copy. In other words, I don't 
know that — there's nothing there to show the clerk ever 
got it. At least it's not in the file. And the circuit 
court sends over every pleading that's in their file, and we 
have that, and there's no notice in the file. So the clerk 
didn't know, and the Court didn't know it at the time it 
came up for trial setting. And when Mr. Thorpe says he 
wasn't aware, and the Court wasn'.t aware of it, also. Of 
course, Mr. Johansen admits he was aware of it and he got a 
copy of it. So maybe there's a partial compliance, and 
maybe that's enough. So, we do have those violations. 
But the Court is of the opinion this is kind of a 
statute that does not require absolute etched-in-stone type 
of compliance, as long as there is a notice and there is 
reasonable effort to try to reach that goal, that there's 
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obligation on both sides to see that he is entitled to his 
constitutional right of a speedy trial. And when it comes 
to affixing absolutely 120 days as the absolute cut off, of 
course, that's not what the statute says. 0£ course, they 
say for good cause. It can go beyond that for good reason. 
For good reason it can go beyond that. And particularly — 
although it's not dealt with at any length in that Trujillo 
case, which is the most recent pronouncement on it — at 
least that I could find -- But as it indicates here, 
assuming that notice was sent as alleged, that the 120 days 
has expired — nevertheless, this appeal fails because the 
discretion vested in the trial court on such matters and 
I've got this case before me -- and in the instant case, the 
delay did not result from the prosecution's actions or — in 
any event the delay was reasonable. So that's what I have 
to look at: was the delay going beyond the 120 days of this 
case reasonable? Of course, the Court does find that it is 
reasonable. Because at the time Mr. Peterson appeared 
before the Court for the trial setting, the C£urt asked him 
specifically — and his counsel if the dates in February 
were agreeable. And although the Court did not get a direct 
answer at the time, that's when Mr. Petersen asked the Court 
to discharge Mr. Thorpe and get him additional counsel. And 
I knew if that was to take place, then you're going to get 
new counsel at that date, and there's no way we could set it 
21 
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lids I lie d u t y t o f i l e I hat - • - ' ' • • L. c l e r k . T h a t ' s n o t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t ' s d u t y . So , we can -ha- a g a i n s t him. Sc 
. he Motion to 
Dismiss. Now, we have one o t h e r mot ion , gent lemen/ and t h a t ' s 
t h*-- M -fin ';> Sever. Y o u ' r e nee o b j e c t i n g t o t h a t , ftr*' ',"<", M> 
iluhrinsen.' 
MR. JOHANSEN. i wish t o make one p o i n t abou t 
l h 11 i HI Hi in i r . 
THE COURT: O k a y . 
MR. JOHANSEN: The Motion to Sever arises out oi 
the Saunders case. 
THE COURT.' il  M i lirii and othei cases; the 
general nature of relevamy 'I IM; ninni i-1 ami t-n im. 
M
«
 T0HANSEN .1" e^'e'i-y case that deals with 
:he issue I . facts in existence: one was the 
defendan - testify. Because i.* • '.<•-
defendant testifies, all • - going uu LUUK IUI 
defendant waiving his right to testify at trial. 
THE COURT: , of crnir.si', I d< • •£ 
vim i IMI , MI Johansen. I don't think we have ... . . lim 
down and make him make that choice at this time, 
OHANSEN: ln> ijoc), testily IliPn 
there's no reason sever. 
24 
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ALLEN S. THORPE #3254 
Emery County Public Defender 
98 East Main Street 
Castle Dale, Utah 84SI s 
(801) 381-5110 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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F I L E D 
IN TH.f SEVENTH JUD'C.'.L P i S ' ^ T COURT 
OF UTAH If, AND rc: i >f.;rr. -r\ 
FEB 1 G 1930 
BF.UCE C PUNK do* 
_ __ \-_'T^ Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTYf STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHf 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYON D. PETERSEN, 
Defendant, 
) 
) MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
) OF JUDGE 
) 
) Criminal No. ^ Y < ^ 
) 
) 3 t JDGE BOYD BUNNELL 
) 
Conies n o w h i y u i 0. I'eteiteiif t h e d e f e n d a n t in tin a b o v e 
e n L i t t i e d a c t i o n , a n d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h R u l e 2 9 . (•), iu.ah R u l e s 
of C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , I n . A , m o v e : H i m \ out i to h a v e the J u d g e , 
B o y d B u n n e l l recusr Innineli, Foil l u a n anil p r e d u d i c e t o w a r d s 
Def endarl ^ e ? • I :r 
fnilowing: 
i - Judge Boyd 
. \M 1Q7^. far 
down. 
1 h i rantinn hv fit jf m q the 
prosecuted Dei endant , on in about 
ift»e of race . \\w Seventh Judicial 
:h 11 i'onv i cf I i 'in handed 
2. Judge Boyd Bunne] 1 recused himself from presiding over a 
tri a] against Defendant on December, *>*> - IQAT- Judge Don Tibbs 
was asigned the trial i i i 1 lis place. 
Therefore Defendant prays that this Motion be granted for 
the substantial reasons so stated. 
Pag i 
DATED th !./£*• day of February,- 1990'. 
Allen S. Thorpi 
Attorney for Defendant 
VERIFICATION 
""!,""i i; undersigned, being first du - ~,, 
deposes and states: 
] That he siegned 1111: foregoing motion, 
2 T ha t t he £ act ua 1 assertations co ntained herein ar e t r ue 
to the best of hi s knowledge, information ^ belief. 
hrtyfrn &) LM 
Bryon D, Petersen 
Signed and sworn 
February. W f f l S J ^ 
1,0 before 
Uilo^ 
h i s /
 tj day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Page 3 
CERTIFICATE Ql SEM1CE 
I hereby certify that I served a LLV copy of 
the foregoing hQIlQB TQ DISQUALIFY JUDGE un • ohansen, 
Emery County Attorneyf by delivering the sair> ,. :..e an: 
the Emery C'ounty Courthouse9 Castle Dale --• •* a* 
of February, 1990. 
APPENDIX E 
THE COURT: Wei ' J record show that 
i ' • i i "  y« i * — minutes after •- time 
tixeo I'M the commencement T1'A1: *n siu d 
already qualified the general jury panel. ^. n.t. Court 
Mil*-", ill i! i-. it cannot grant 
• l al this ti * . waste the entire time ^f * * wirt 
without Hi having been filed sometime prior so ti.e Lnurt 
C O U 1 ( 1 II II 111 I' 1 J 1 (.|« I 
delay of the t =. o- be an abuse - aa, , a 
system il i weie Lv^  ^ a n i tnau av, w,*.-w * A - G Anythin_, 
e i , t " 
MR CHIARA: Yes, Your Honor- Thirdly, we 
THE COURT: . - . a wr iting, Mr. Ch i d t• a /"' 
MR CHIARA,: Nr», 
change of venu€ imely made, and doesn • *. .
 t . *. 
Rules UL u v u Procedure * t appears t hf 
that it's mere] v an a11 
system. Anything else? 
TrfIARA: A Moti m /< >r Mistrial, Y o u r Hu 
22 ! based upon the adverse inferences of jurors that have bee 
2| dismissed and statements made. 
2 4 I i 11 11' ii i I "' i tw™1 1 'i iiiii/i Jfl - * 
25 can t 1 >e a mistrial. We haven't even had a trial yet 
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